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Abstract
Even in simple multi-agent systems, fixed incentives can lead to outcomes that
are poor for the group and each individual agent. We propose a method, D3C,
for online adjustment of agent incentives that reduces the loss incurred at a Nash
equilibrium. Agents adjust their incentives by learning to mix their incentive
with that of other agents, until a compromise is reached in a distributed fashion.
We show that D3C improves outcomes for each agent and the group as a whole
on several social dilemmas including a traffic network with Braess’s paradox, a
prisoner’s dilemma, and several reinforcement learning domains.
1 Introduction
We consider a setting composed of multiple interacting artificially intelligent agents. These agents will
be instantiated by humans, corporations, or machines with specific individual incentives. However, it
is well known that the interactions between individual agent goals can lead to inefficiencies at the
group level, for example, in environments exhibiting social dilemmas [6, 20, 26]. In order to resolve
these inefficiencies, agents must reach a compromise.
Any arbitration mechanism that leverages a central coordinator1 faces challenges when attempting
to scale to large populations. The coordinator’s task becomes intractable as it must both query
preferences from a larger population and make a decision accounting for the exponential growth of
agent interactions. If agents or their designers are permitted to modify their incentives over time,
the principal must collect all this information again, exacerbating the computational burden. A
central coordinator represents a single point of failure for the system whereas one motivation for
multi-agent systems research inspired by nature (e.g., humans, ants, the body, etc.) is robustness to
node failures [12]. Therefore, we focus on decentralized approaches.
A trivial form of decentralized compromise is to require every agent to minimize group loss (max-
imize welfare). Leaving the optimization problem aside, this removes inefficiency, but similar to
a mechanism with a central coordinator, requires communicating all goals between all agents, an
expensive step and one with real consequences for existing distributed systems like wireless sensor
networks [24] where transmitting a signal saps a node’s energy budget. There is also the obvious
issue that this compromise may not appeal to an individual agent, especially one that is expected to
trade its low-loss state for a higher average group loss. One additional, more subtle consequence of
optimizing group loss is that it cannot distinguish between behaviors in environments with a group
loss that is constant sum, for instance, in zero-sum games. But zero-sum games have rich structure to
which we would like agents to respond. Electing a team leader (or voting on a decision) implies one
candidate (decision) wins while another loses. Imagine two agents differ on their binary preference
1For example, the VCG mechanism [8].
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with each trying to minimize their probability of losing. A group loss is indifferent; we prefer the
agents play the game (and in this, case argue their points).
Design Criteria: We seek an approach to compromise in multi-agent systems that applies to the
setting just described. The celebrated Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem [1, 46, 18, 32] states that no
mechanism exists that simultaneously achieves optimal efficiency (welfare-maximizing behavior),
budget-balance (no taxing agents and burning side-payments), appeals to rational individuals (indi-
viduals want to opt-in to the mechanism), and is incentive compatible (resulting behavior is a Nash
equilibrium). Given this impossibility result, we aim to design a mechanism that approximates weaker
notions of these criteria. In addition, the mechanism should should be decentralized, extensible to
large populations, and adapt to learning agents with evolving incentives in possibly non-stationary
environments.
Design: We formulate compromise as agents mixing their incentives with others. In other words,
an agent may become incentivized to minimize a mixture of their loss and other agents’ losses. We
design a decentralized meta-algorithm to search over the space of these possible mixtures.
We model the problem of efficiency using price of anarchy. The price of anarchy, ρ ∈ [1,∞), is a
measure of inefficiency from algorithmic game theory with lower values indicating more efficient
games [35]. Forcing agents to minimize a group (average) loss with a single local minimum results in
a “game” with ρ = 1. Note that any optimal group loss solution is also Pareto-efficient. Computing
the price of anarchy of a game is intractable in general. Instead, we derive a differentiable upper
bound on the price of anarchy that agents can optimize incrementally over time. Differentiability of
the bound makes it easy to pair the proposed mechanism with, for example, deep learning agents that
optimize via gradient descent [27, 38]. Budget balance is achieved exactly by placing constraints on
the allowable mixtures of losses. We appeal to individual rationality in three ways. One, we initialize
all agents to optimize only their own losses. Two, we include penalties for agents that deviate from
this state and mix their losses with others. Three, we show empirically on several domains that opting
into the the proposed mechanism results in better individual outcomes. We also provide specific,
albeit narrow, conditions under which agents may achieve a Nash equilibrium, i.e. the mechanism is
incentive compatible, and demonstrate the agents achieving a Nash equilibrium under our proposed
mechanism in a traffic network problem.
The approach we propose divides the loss mixture coefficients among the agents to be learned
individually; critically, the agents do not need to observe or directly differentiate with respect to the
other agent strategies. In this work, we do not tackle the challenge of scaling communication of
incentives to very large populations; we leave this to future work. Under our approach, scale can be
achieved through randomly sharing incentives according to the learned mixture weights or sparse
optimization over the simplex [39, 25, 29].
Our Contribution: We propose a differentiable, local estimator of game inefficiency, as measured
by price of anarchy. We then present two instantiations of a single decentralized meta-algorithm, one
1st order (gradient-feedback) and one 0th order (bandit-feedback), that reduce this inefficiency. This
meta-algorithm is general and can be applied to any group of individual agent learning algorithms.
This paper focuses on how to enable a group of agents to respond to an unknown environment and
minimize overall inefficiency. Agents with distinct losses may find their incentives well aligned to
the given task, however, they may instead encounter a social dilemma (Sec. 3). We also show that our
approach leads to interesting behavior in scenarios where agents may need to sacrifice team reward
to save an individual (Sec. F.4) or need to form parties and vote on a new team direction (Sec. 3.4).
Ideally, one meta-algorithm would allow a multi-agent system to perform sufficiently well in all these
scenarios. The approach we propose, D3C (Sec. 2), is not that meta-algorithm, but it represents a
holistic effort to combine critical ingredients that we hope takes a step in the right direction.2
2 Dynamically Changing the Game
In our approach, agents may consider slight re-definitions of their original losses, thereby changing
the definition of the original game. Critically, this is done in a way that conserves the original sum
of losses (budget-balanced) so that the original group loss can still be measured. In this section,
2D3C is agnostic to any action or strategy semantics. We are interested in rich environments where high level
actions with semantics such as “cooperation” and “defection” are not easily extracted or do not exist.
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we derive our approach to minimizing the price of anarchy in several steps. First we formulate
minimizing the price of anarchy via compromise as an optimization problem. Second we specifically
consider compromise as the linear mixing of agent incentives. Next, we define a local price of anarchy
and derive an upper bound that agents can differentiate. Then, we decompose this bound into a set of
differentiable objectives, one for each agent. Finally, we develop a gradient estimator to minimize the
agent objectives in settings with bandit feedback (e.g., RL) that enables scalable decentralization.
2.1 Notation and Transformed Losses
Let agent i’s loss be fi(x) : x ∈ X → R where x is the joint strategy of all agents. Let fAi (x) denote
agent i’s transformed loss which mixes losses among agents. Let f(x) = [f1(x), . . . , fn(x)]> and
fA(x) = [fA1 (x), . . . , f
A
n (x)]
> where n ∈ Z denotes the number of agents. In general, we require
fAi (x) > 0
3 and
∑
i f
A
i (x) =
∑
i fi(x) so that total loss is conserved; note that the agents are simply
exploring the space of possible non-negative group loss decompositions. We consider transformations
of the form fA(x) = A>f(x) where each agent i controls row i of A with each row constrained to
the simplex, i.e. Ai ∈ ∆n−1. X ∗ denotes the set of Nash equilibria. [a; b] = [a>, b>]> signifies row
stacking of vectors.
2.2 Price of Anarchy
Nisan et al. [35] define price of anarchy as the worst value of an equilibrium divided by the best value
in the game. Here, value means sum of player losses, best means lowest, and Nash is the equilibrium.
It is well known that Nash can be arbitrarily bad from both an individual agent and group perspective;
Appendix B presents a simple example and demonstrates how opponent shaping is not a balm for
these issues [15, 28]. With the above notation, the price of anarchy, ρ, is defined as
ρX (fA)
def
=
maxX∗
∑
i f
A
i (x
∗)
minX
∑
i f
A
i (x)
≥ 1. (1)
Note that computing the price of anarchy precisely requires solving both an optimization problem
and a Nash equilibrium problem, which is PPAD-complete [9, 17]. We explain how we circumvent
this issue with a local approximation in §2.4.
2.3 Compromise as an Optimization Problem
Given a game, we want to minimize the price of anarchy by perturbing the original agent losses:
min
f ′=ψA(f)
1>f ′=1>f
ρX (f ′) + νD(f ,f ′) (2)
where f and f ′ = ψA(f) denote the vectors of original and perturbed losses respectively, ψA :
Rn → Rn is parameterized by weights A, ν is a regularization hyperparameter, and D penalizes
deviation of the perturbed losses from the originals or represents constraints through an indicator
function. To ensure minimizing the price of anarchy of the perturbed game improves on the original,
we incorporate the constraint that the sum of perturbed losses equals the sum of original losses. We
refer to this approach as ρ-minimization.
Our agents reconstruct their losses using the losses of all other agents as a basis. For simplicity, we
consider linear transformations of their loss functions, although the theoretical bounds hereafter are
independent of this simplification. We also restrict ourselves to convex combinations so that agents do
not learn incentives that are directly adverse to other agents. The problem can now be reformulated.
Let ψA(f) = A>f and D(f, f ′) =
∑
iDKL(ei || Ai) where A ∈ Rn×n is a right stochastic matrix
(rows are non-negative and sum to 1), ei ∈ Rn is a unit vector with a 1 at index i, and DKL denotes
the Kullback-Liebler divergence. Note OpenAI Five [38] also used a linear mixing approach where
the “team spirit" mixture parameter (τ ) is manually annealed throughout training from 0.3 to 1.0 (i.e.,
Aii = 1− 0.8τ,Aij = 0.2τ, j 6= i).
3The price of anarchy assumes positive losses. This is accounted for in §2.5 to allow for losses in R.
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2.4 A Local Price of Anarchy
The price of anarchy, ρ ≥ 1, is defined over the joint strategy space of all players. Computing it is
intractable for general games. However, many agents learn via gradient-based training, and so only
observe the portion of the strategy space explored by their learning trajectory. Hence, we imbue our
agents with the ability to locally estimate the price of anarchy along this trajectory.
Definition 1 (Local Price of Anarchy). Define
ρx(f
A,∆t) =
maxX∗τ
∑
i f
A
i (x
∗)
minτ∈[0,∆t]
∑
i f
A
i (x− τF (x))
≥ 1 (3)
where F (x) = [∇x1fA1 (x); . . . ;∇xnfAn (x)], ∆t is a small step size, fAi is assumed positive ∀ i, andX ∗τ denotes the set of equilibria of the game when constrained to the line.
Figure 1: Agents estimate the price of anarchy assuming the joint strategy space, X , of the game is
restricted to a local linear region, Xτ , extending from the currently learned joint strategy, xt, to the
next, xt+1. ρ and ρx denote the global and local price of anarchy.
To obtain bounds, we leverage theoretical results on smooth games, summarized as a class of games
where “the externality imposed on any one player by the others is bounded” [43]. We assume a
Lipschitz property on all fAi (x) (details in Theorem 1), which allows us to appeal to this class of
games. The bound in Eqn (4) is tight for some games. Proofs can be found in appendix D.
Theorem 1 (Local Utilitarian Price of Anarchy). Assuming each agent’s loss is positive and its loss
gradient is Lipschitz, there exists a learning rate ∆t > 0 sufficiently small such that, to O(∆t2), the
local utilitarian price of anarchy of the game, ρx(fA,∆t), is upper bounded by
max
i
{1 + ∆t ReLU
( d
dt
log(fAi (x)) +
||∇xifAi (x)||2
fAi (x)µ¯
)
} (4)
where i indexes each agent, µ¯ is a user defined positive scalar, ReLU(z) def= max(z, 0), and Lipschitz
implies there exists a βi such that ||∇xifAi (x)−∇yifAi (y)|| ≤ βi||x− y|| ∀x,y, A.
Recall that this work focuses on price of anarchy defined using total loss as the value of the game.
This is a utilitarian objective. We also derive an upper bound on the local egalitarian price of anarchy
where value is defined as the max loss over all agents (replace
∑
i with maxi in Eqn (3); see §D.2).
2.5 Decentralized Learning of the Loss Mixture Matrix A
Minimizing Eqn (2) w.r.t. A can become intractable if n is large. Moreover, if solving for A at each
step is the responsibility of a central authority, the system is vulnerable to this authority failing. A
distributed solution is therefore appealing, and the local price of anarchy bound admits a natural
decomposition over agents. Equation 2 becomes
min
Ai∈∆n−1
ρi + νDKL(ei || Ai) (5)
where ρi = 1+∆t ReLU
(
d
dt log(f
A
i (x))+
||∇xifAi (x)||2
fAi (x)µ¯
)
. This objective is differentiable w.r.t. each
Ai with gradient∇Aiρi ∝ ∇AiReLU
(
d
dt log(f
A
i (x)) +
||∇xifAi (x)||2
fAi (x)µ¯
)
. The log appears due to price
of anarchy being defined as the worst case Nash total loss divided by the minimal total loss. We
propose the following modified learning rule for a hypothetical price of anarchy which is defined as a
difference and accepts negative loss: Ai ← Ai − ηA∇˜Aiρi where ηA is a learning rate and
∇˜Aiρi = ∇AiReLU
( d
dt
fAi (x) + 
)
. [ is a hyperparameter.] (6)
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The update direction in (6) is proportional to ∇Aiρi asymptotically for large fAi ; see §D.1.1 for
further discussion. Each agent i updates xi and Ai simultaneously using∇xifAi (x) and ∇˜Aiρi.
Improve-Stay, Suffer-Shift—∇Aiρi encodes the rule: if the loss is decreasing, maintain the mixing
weights, otherwise, change them. This strategy applies Win-Stay, Lose-Shift (WSLS) [41] to learning
(derivatives) rather than outcomes (losses). WSLS was shown to outperform Tit-for-Tat [40] in an
iterated prisoner’s dilemma [36, 23].
Note that the trival solution of minimizing average group loss coincides with Aij = 1n for all i, j.
If the agent strategies converge to a social optimum, this is a fixed point in the augmented strategy
space (x,A). This can be seen by noting that 1) convergence to an optimum implies∇xifAi (x) = 0
and 2) convergence alone implies dfidt = 0 for all agents so∇Ai = 0 by Eqn (6) assuming  = 0.
2.6 Decentralized Learning & Extending to Reinforcement Learning
The time derivative of each agent’s loss, ddtf
A
i (x), in Eqn (6) requires differentiating through
potentially all other agent loss functions, which precludes scaling to large populations. In addition,
this derivative is not always available as a differentiable function. In order to estimate ∇˜Aiρi when
only scalar estimates of ρi are available as in, e.g., reinforcement learning (RL), each agent perturbs
their loss mixture and commits to this perturbation for a random number of training steps. If the
loss increases over the trial, the agent updates their mixture in a direction opposite the perturbation.
Otherwise, no update is performed.
This is formally accomplished with approximate one-shot gradient estimates [48]. A one-shot
gradient estimate of ρi(Ai) is performed by first evaluating ρi(log(Ai) + δa˜i) where δ is a scalar and
a˜i ∼ Usp(n) is drawn uniformly from the unit sphere in Rn. Then, an unbiased gradient is given by
n
δ ρi(log(Ai) + δa˜i)a˜i where Ai ∈ ∆n−1. In practice, we cannot evaluate in one shot the ddtfAi (x)
term that appears in the definition of ρi. Instead, Algorithm 1 uses finite differences and we assume
the evaluation remains accurate enough across training steps.
Algorithm 1 requires arguments: ηA is a global learning rate for each Ai, δ is a perturbation scalar for
the one-shot gradient estimate, τmin and τmax specify the lower and upper bounds for the duration of
the mixing trial for estimating a finite difference of ddtf
A
i (x), l and h specify lower and upper bounds
for clipping A in logit space (lb·eh), and Li is a learning algorithm that takes A as input (in order to
mix rewards) and outputs discounted return.  indicates elementwise division.
Algorithm 1 D3C Update for RL Agent i
Input: ηA, δ, ν, τmin, τmax, A0i , , l, h, L, iterations T
Ai ← A0i {Initialize Mixing Weights}
{Draw Initial Random Mixing Trial}
A˜i, a˜, τ, tb, Gb = trial(δ, τmin, τmax, Ai, 0, G)
G = 0 {Initialize Mean Return of Trial}
for t = 0 : T do
g = Li(A˜i ∀ i) {Update Policy With Mixed Rewards}
∆tb = t− tb {Elapsed Trial Steps}
G = (G(∆tb − 1) + g)/∆tb {Update Mean Return}
if ∆tb == τ {Trial Complete} then
ρ˜i = ReLU(Gb−Gτ + ) {Approximate ρ}∇Ai = ρ˜ia˜− νei Ai {Estimate Gradient —(6)}
Ai = softmax lblog(Ai)−ηA∇Aieh {Update}
{Draw New Random Mixing Trial}
A˜i, a˜, τ, tb, Gb = trial(δ, τmin, τmax, Ai, t, G)
end if
end for
Algorithm 2 Li—example learner
Input: A˜ = [A˜1; . . . ; A˜n]
while episode not terminal do
draw action from agent policy
play action and observe reward ri
broadcast ri to all agents
update policy with r˜i =
∑
j A˜jirj
end while
Output: return over episode g
Algorithm 3 trial—helper function
Input: δ, τmin, τmax, Ai, t, G
{Sample Perturbation Direction}
a˜i ∼ Usp(n)
{Perturb Mixture}
A˜i = softmax(log(Ai) + δa˜i)
{Draw Random Trial Length}
τ ∼ Uniform{τmin, τmax}
Output: A˜i, a˜, τ, t, G
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2.7 Assessment
We assess Algorithm 1 with respect to our original design criteria. As described, agents perform
gradient descent on a decentralized and local upper bound on the price of anarchy. Recall that a
minimal global price of anarchy (ρ = 1) implies that even the worst case Nash equilibrium of the
game is socially optimal; similarly, Algorithm 1 searches for a locally socially optimal equilibrium.
By design, Ai ∈ ∆n−1 ensures the approach is budget-balancing. We justify the agents learning
weight vectors Ai by initializing them to attend primarily to their own losses as in the original
game. If they can minimize their original loss, then they never shift attention according to Eqn (6)
because dfidt ≤ 0 for all t. They only shift Ai if their loss increases. We also include a KL term to
encourage the weights to return to their initial values. In addition, in our experiments with symmetric
games, learning A helps the agents’ outcomes in the long run. We also consider experiments in
Appendix E.2.2 where only a subset of agents opt into the mechanism. If each agent’s original loss is
convex with diagonally dominant Hessian and the strategy space is unconstrained, the the unique,
globally stable fixed point of the game defined with mixed losses is a Nash (see Appendix H.4). Exact
gradients ∇Aiρi require each agent differentiates through all other agents losses precluding a fully
decentralized and scalable algorithm. We circumvent this issue with noisy oneshot gradients. All
that is needed in terms of centralization is to share the mixed scalar rewards; this is cheap compared
to sharing xi ∈ Rd. As mentioned in the introduction, the cost of communicating rewards can be
mitigated by learning Ai via sparse optimization or sampling but is outside the scope of this paper.
3 Experiments
Here, we show that agents minimizing local estimates of price of anarchy achieve lower loss on
average than selfish, rational agents in three domains. Due to space, we leave two other domains to
the appendix. In the first domain, a traffic network (4 players), players optimize using exact gradients
(see Eqn (6)). Then in two RL domains, Coins and Cleanup, players optimize with approximate
gradients as handled by Algorithm 1. Agents train with deep networks and A2C [13]. We refer to
both algorithms as D3C (decentralized, differentiable, dynamic compromise).
For D3C, we initialize Aii = 0.99 and Aij = 0.01n−1 , j 6= i. We initialize away from a one-hot because
we use entropic mirror descent [2] to update Ai, and this method requires iterates to be initialized to
the interior of the simplex. In the RL domains, updates to Ai are clipped in logit-space to be within
l = −5 and h = 5 (see Algorithm 1). We set the DKL coefficient to 0 except for in Coins, where
ν = 10−5. Additional hyperparameters are specified in §G. In experiments, reported price of anarchy
refers to the ratio of the sum of losses of the strategy learning converged to over that of the strategy
learned by fully cooperative agents (Aij = 1n ).
3.1 Traffic Networks and Braess’s Paradox
In 2009, New York city’s mayor closed Broadway near Times Square to alleviate traffic conges-
tion [34]. This counter-intuitive phenomenon, where restricting commuter choices improves outcomes,
is called Braess’s paradox [51, 3, 6], and has been observed in real traffic networks [56, 49]. Braess’s
paradox is also found in physics [56], decentralized energy grids [54], and can cause extinction
cascades in ecosystems [45]. Knowing when a network may exhibit this paradox is difficult, which
means knowing when network dynamics may result in poor outcomes is difficult.
Figure 2a presents a theoretical traffic network. Without edge AB, drivers commute according to the
Nash equilibrium, either learned by gradient descent or D3C. Figure 3a shows the price of anarchy
approaching 1 for both algorithms. If edge AB is added, the network now exhibits Braess’s paradox.
Figure 3b shows that while gradient descent converges to Nash (ρ = 8065 ), D3C achieves a price
of anarchy near 1. Figure 2b shows that when faced with a randomly drawn network, D3C agents
achieve shorter commutes on average than agents without the ability to compromise.
3.2 Coin Dilemma
In the Coins game [10, 27], two agents move on a fully-observed 5× 5 gridworld, on which coins
of two types corresponding to each agent randomly spawn at each time step with probability 0.005.
When an agent moves into a square with a coin of either type, they get a reward of 1. When an agent
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S E
A
B
10
·n S
A
10
·n B
E
45
45
0
nSA ∈ {0− 4}, nBE ∈ {0− 4}
10nSA + 10nBE < 10nSA + 45
10nSA + 10nBE < 10nBE + 45
(a) Traffic Network (b) Random Network Results
Figure 2: (a) Four drivers aim to minimize commute time from S to E. Commute time on each
edge depends on the number of commuters, nij . Without edge AB, drivers distribute evenly across
SAE and SBE for a 65 min commute. After edge AB is added, switching to the shortcut, SABE,
always decreases commute time given the other drivers maintain their routes, however, all drivers are
incentivized to take the shortcut resulting in an 80 min commute. (b) The price of anarchy throughout
training for 1000 randomly generated three road networks exhibiting Braess’s paradox. Gradient
descent and D3C are compared with shaded regions representing ± 1 standard devation.
(a) Without Shortcut (Edge AB Removed) (b) With Shortcut (Edge AB Included)
Figure 3: Traffic Network (a) Without edge AB, agents are initialized with random strategies and
train with either gradient descent (left) or D3C (right)—similar performance expected. Statistics
of 1000 runs are plotted over training. Median ρmax tracks the median over trials longest-commute
among the four drivers. The shaded region captures ± 1 standard deviation around the mean. (b)
After edge AB is added, agents are initialized with random strategies and trained with either gradient
descent (left) or D3C (right). Statistics of 1000 runs are plotted over training. Median ρmax tracks
the median over trials of the longest-commute among the four drivers. The shaded region captures ±
1 standard deviation around the mean.
picks up a coin of the other player’s type, the other agent gets a reward of −2. The episode lasts 500
steps. Total reward is maximized when each agent picks up only coins of their own type, but players
are tempted to pick up all coins.
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Training Epochs (Billions)
0
20
40
60
D3C 41.8
Cooperative 51.8
A2C 6.0
Metric Matching Imitation 29.4
Average Total Return
(a) Trial Statistics (b) Individual Run
Figure 4: Coin Dilemma (a) Mean total return over ten training runs for agents. Mean return over all
epochs is next to each method name in the legend. D3C hyperparameters were selected using five
independent validation runs. Cooperative agents trained to maximize total return represent the best
possible baseline. Shaded region captures ± 1 standard deviation around the mean. (b) One training
run (A0ii = 0.9): sum of agent returns (left); % of coins picked up that were the agent’s type (middle);
relative reward attention measured as ln
(
Aii
Aj 6=i
)
(right).
D3C agents approach optimal cooperative returns (see Figure 4a). We compare against Metric
Matching Imitation [11], which was previously tested on Coins and designed to exhibit reciprocal
behavior towards co-players.
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Figure 4b shows D3C agents learning to cooperate, then temporarily defecting before rediscovering
cooperation. Note that the relative reward attention of both players spikes towards selfish during this
small defection window; agents collect more of their opponent’s coins during this time. Oscillating
between cooperation and defection occurred across various hyperparameter settings. Relative reward
attention trajectories between agents appear to be reciprocal, i.e., move in relative synchrony (see §H.2
for analysis).
3.3 Cleanup
We provide additional results on Cleanup, a five-player gridworld game [22]. Agents are rewarded for
eating apples, but must keep a river clean to ensure the apples receive sufficient nutrients. The option
to be a freeloader and only eat apples presents a social dilemma. D3C is able to increase both welfare
and individual reward over A2C (no loss sharing). We also observe that direct welfare maximization
(Cooperation) always results in three agents collecting rewards from apples while two agents sacrifice
themselves and clean the river. In contrast, D3C avoids this stark division of labor. Agents take turns
on each task and all achieve some positive cumulative return over training.
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Training Epochs (Billions)
0
1000
2000
3000
Cooperative 2171
D3C 1655
A2C 10
Average Total Return
(a) Cleanup
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Training Epochs (Billions)
250
0
250
500
750
1000
Cooperative
D3C
A2C
Individual Alltime Mean Returns
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Training Epochs (Billions)
250
0
250
500
750
1000
Cooperative
D3C
A2C
Individual Alltime Mean Returns
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Training Epochs (Billions)
250
0
250
500
750
1000
Cooperative
D3C
A2C
Individual Alltime Mean Returns
(b) Individual Runs
Figure 5: (a) Mean total return over ten training runs for agents. D3C hyperparameters were selected
using five independent validation runs. Cooperative agents trained to maximize total return represent
the best possible baseline. Shaded region captures ± 1 standard deviation around the mean. (b) Three
randomly selected runs. Each curve shows the mean return up to the current epoch for 1 of 5 agents.
3.4 A Zero-Sum Election
Consider a hierarchical election in which two parties compete in a zero-sum game—for example,
only one candidate becomes president. If, at the primary stage, candidates within one party engage
in negative advertising, they hurt their chances of winning the presidential election because these
ads are now out in the open. This presents a prisoner’s dilemma within each party. The goal then
is for each party to solve their respective prisoner’s dilemma and come together as one team, but
certainly not maximize welfare—the zero-sum game between the two parties should be retained. A
simple simulation with two parties consisting of two candidates each initially participating in negative
advertising converges to the desired result after running D3C.
The final 4× 4 loss mixing matrix, A, after training 1000 steps is an approximate block matrix with
0.46 on the 2× 2 block diagonal and 0.04 elsewhere. We make a duck-typing argument that when
multiple agents are optimizing the same loss, they are functioning as multiple components of a single
agent because mathematically, there is no difference between this multi-agent system and a single
agent optimization problem. This matrix then indicates that two approximate teams have formed: the
first two agents captured by the upper left block and vice versa. Furthermore, the final eigenvalues of
the game Jacobian are (1.84± 0.21i)×2; perfect team formation gives (2± 0.25i)×2. The existence
of imaginary eigenvalues indicates that the zero-sum component of the game is retained. In contrast,
minimizing total loss gives 0 imaginary part because Hessians (Jac(∇)) are symmetric.
4 Conclusion
Directly maximizing welfare can solve many social dilemmas, but it fails to draw out the rich behavior
we would expect from agents in other interesting scenarios. We formulate learning incentives as
a price of anarchy minimization problem and propose a decentralized, gradient-based approach,
namely D3C, that incrementally adapts agent incentives to the environment at hand. We demonstrate
its effectiveness on achieving near-optimal agent outcomes in socially adversarial environments.
Importantly, it also generates reasonable responses where welfare maximization is indifferent.
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A Mechanism Design
Mechanism design prescribes a way for resolving compromise between self-interested agents [35]. For
example, in the VCG mechanism [8], all agents must reveal their incentives to a central coordinator,
the principal. This mechanism achieves optimal group behavior by taxing each agent appropriately
but then “burns” the collected payments, failing eliminate all the original inefficiency [21, 19, 42],
i.e., VCG is not strongly budget-balanced.
B Bad Nash & Futile Opponent Shaping
Here, we present a small two-player game where the Nash equilibrium results in poor outcomes
for both agents individually and as a group. We then point out how although an opponent shaping
approach would typically be able to manipulate players into avoiding such equilibria, it fails in this
specific game. We seek a general algorithm for resolving multi-agent dilemmas and so we propose a
new solution.
B.1 Bad Nash
Game 1 (Nash Paradox) minx1∈[0,1] f1(x1, x2) = x21 +
1
x22+κ
, minx2∈[0,1] f2(x1, x2) = x
2
2 +
1
x21+κ
.
The unique Nash equilibrium of this general-sum game is (x1, x2)=(0, 0) regardless of κ ∈ [0, 1); at
Nash, each player sees a loss of 1κ . The minimal total loss solution is (x1, x2) = (
√
1− κ,√1− κ)
for κ < 1 where each player sees a loss of 2− κ. The price of anarchy is 1/κ2−κ which goes to∞ as
κ → 0. For κ < golden ratio−1 ≈ 0.618, Nash achieves maximum total loss among all possible
strategy sets. While computing a Nash is an important technical problem, Game 1 proves that even if
a Nash can be computed, it may be undesirable. Thus solving for Nash is orthogonal to this work.
B.2 Gradient Descent Without Descent
Game 1 shows that the Nash equilibrium can give the worst outcome for all agents. It follows that
agents learning with gradient descent in this game must observe their loss increase upon their final
approach to Nash. Why stick to gradient descent then? In multi-agent games, the adjustment of
another player’s strategy coupled with our own can increase our loss. Let fi(t) be shorthand for
fi(x(t)) where x(t) contains all strategies at time (iteration) t. Then a series expansion (see Eqn (7))
of agent i’s loss around the current time step makes this concrete:
fi(t+ ∆t) = fi(t) + ∆t
dfi
dt
+
∆t2
2
d2fi
dt2
+O(∆t3) (7)
= fi(t) + ∆t
∂fi
∂xi
dxi
dt
+
∆t2
2
[∂2fi
∂x2i
(dxi
dt
)2
+
∂fi
∂xi
d2xi
dt2
+ 2
∑
j 6=i
∂2fi
∂xi∂xj
dxi
dt
dxj
dt
]
+ h(
dxj 6=i
dt
) +O(∆t3) (8)
where ∆t > 0 is a small learning rate and h(dxj 6=idt ) contains terms that agent i cannot manipulate
(i.e., h is constant w.r.t. agent i’s update dynamics, dxidt ). We show the full derivation of the series
expansion in Section C for those interested.
B.3 The Update Is Not The Only Problem
In Eqn (7), other agents can affect fi(t+ ∆t) through the bold terms and h(
dxj 6=i
dt ). The bold terms
indicate where agent i’s update couples with other players’ updates [47]. To account for these terms,
agent i must predict the other agents’ updates, dxjdt , and understand how their behaviors affect agent
i’s loss, d
2fi
dxidxj
. Recent methods, such as LOLA, LookAhead and Stable Opponent Shaping [15, 28],
model these terms. However, all these methods converge to Nash in Game 1 because d
2fi
dxidxj
= 0 as
do all other mixed derivatives of agent i’s loss. In contrast, agent i can never mitigate increases in
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loss due to h. Incorporating more terms in the expansion generates higher level reasoning, but even
the infinite expansion cannot avoid the Nash paradox in Game 1. If x1 knows x2’s learning trajectory
converges to 0, x1 is still incentivized to play 0. The fault lies in the game, not the learning.
C Taylor Series Expansion
Here, we derive the Taylor series expansion given in Section B.2. The derivation is as follows:
dfi
dt
=
∑
j
∂fi
∂xj
dxj
dt
=
∂fi
∂xi
dxi
dt
+
∑
j 6=i
∂fi
∂xj
dxj
dt
(9)
d2fi
dt2
=
d
dt
(dfi
dt
)
=
d
dt
(∑
j
∂fi
∂xj
dxj
dt
)
=
∑
j
d
dt
( ∂fi
∂xj
dxj
dt
)
(10)
=
∑
j
[ d
dt
( ∂fi
∂xj
)dxj
dt
+
∂fi
∂xj
d2xj
dt2
]
(11)
=
∑
j
[(∑
k
∂2fi
∂xj∂xk
dxk
dt
)dxj
dt
+
∂fi
∂xj
d2xj
dt2
]
(12)
= 2
∑
j 6=i
∂2fi
∂xj∂xi
dxi
dt
dxj
dt
+
∂2fi
∂x2i
(dxi
dt
)2
(13)
+
∑
j 6=i
∑
k 6=i
∂2fi
∂xj∂xk
dxj
dt
dxk
dt
+
∑
j 6=i
∂fi
∂xj
d2xj
dt2
+
∂fi
∂xi
d2xi
dt2
(14)
h(
dxj 6=i
dt
) = ∆t
∑
j 6=i
∂fi
∂xj
dxj
dt
+
∆t2
2
[∑
j 6=i
∑
k 6=i
∂2fi
∂xj∂xk
dxj
dt
dxk
dt
+
∑
j 6=i
∂fi
∂xj
d2xj
dt2
]
(15)
fi(t+ ∆t) = fi(t) + ∆t
∂fi
∂xi
dxi
dt
+
∆t2
2
[∂2fi
∂x2i
(dxi
dt
)2
+
∂fi
∂xi
d2xi
dt2
+ 2
∑
j 6=i
∂2fi
∂xi∂xj
dxi
dt
dxj
dt
]
(16)
+ h(
dxj 6=i
dt
) +O(∆t3). (17)
D Derivation of an Upper Bound on Local Price of Anarchy
Definition 2 (Smooth Game). A game is (λ, µ)-smooth [43] if:
N∑
i=1
fAi (xi, x
′
−i) ≤ λ
N∑
i=1
fAi (xi, x−i) + µ
N∑
i=1
fAi (x
′
i, x
′
−i) (18)
for all x, x′ ∈ X where λ > 0, µ < 1, and∑i fAi (x) is assumed to be non-negative for any x ∈ X .
The last condition is needed for the price of anarchy to be meaningful.
Lemma 2 (Smooth Games Imply a Bound on Price of Anarchy). The price of anarchy, ρ, the ratio of
the worst case Nash total loss to the minimal total loss, is bounded above by a ratio of the coefficients
of a smooth game [43]:
ρ =
maxX∗
∑
i f
A
i (x
∗)
minX
∑
i f
A
i (x)
≥ 1 (19)
≤ inf
λ>0,µ<1
[ λ
1− µ
]
. (20)
where x∗ is an element of the set of Nash equilibria, X ∗.
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Assume the loss function gradients are Lipschitz as well. We say a loss function, fAi (x) =
fAi (xi, x−i), has a βi-Lipschitz gradient for all A if
||∇xifAi (x)−∇yifAi (y)|| ≤ βi||x− y|| ∀x, y,A. (21)
Note that this implies
||∇xifAi (xi, z−i)−∇yifAi (yi, z−i)|| ≤ βi||xi − yi|| ∀xi, yi, z−i, A (22)
as a special case.
The following lemmas are useful in deriving a local notion of smoothness.
Lemma 3. If fAi (xi, x−i) = gi(x) has a βi-Lipschitz gradient, then∣∣∣||∇xigi(x)|| − ||∇yigi(y)||∣∣∣ ≤ βi||x− y|| ∀ x, y. (23)
Proof. The proof proceeds in two main steps. First,
||∇yigi(y)|| = ||∇xigi(x) +∇yigi(y)−∇xigi(x)|| (24)
≤ ||∇xigi(x)||+ ||∇xigi(x)−∇yigi(y)|| by triangle inequality (25)
≤ ||∇xigi(x)||+ βi||x− y|| by Lipschitz gradient (26)
which implies ||∇yigi(y)|| − ||∇xigi(x)|| ≤ βi||x− y||. And vice versa,
||∇xigi(x)|| = ||∇yigi(y) +∇xigi(x)−∇yigi(y)|| (27)
≤ ||∇yigi(y)||+ ||∇xigi(x)−∇yigi(y)|| by triangle inequality (28)
≤ ||∇yigi(y)||+ βi||x− y|| by Lipschitz gradient (29)
which implies ||∇xigi(x)|| − ||∇yigi(y)|| ≤ βi||x − y||. The two implications together prove the
lemma.
Lemma 4. If fAi (xi, x−i) = gi(x) has a βi-Lipschitz gradient, then∣∣∣||∇xigi(x)||2 − ||∇yigi(y)||2∣∣∣ ≤ 3β2i ||x− y||2 + 2βi||∇xigi(x)||||x− y|| ∀ x, y. (30)
Proof. The proof proceeds similarly to before. First,
||∇yigi(y)||2 = ||∇xigi(x) +∇yigi(y)−∇xigi(x)||2 (31)
≤
(
||∇xigi(x)||+ ||∇xigi(x)−∇yigi(y)||
)2
by triangle inequality (32)
= ||∇xigi(x)||2 + ||∇xigi(x)−∇yigi(y)||2 + 2||∇xigi(x)||||∇xigi(x)−∇yigi(y)||
(33)
≤ ||∇xigi(x)||2 + β2i ||x− y||2 + 2βi||∇xigi(x)||||x− y|| by Lipschitz gradient and Lemma 3
(34)
which implies ||∇yigi(y)||2 − ||∇xigi(x)||2 ≤ β2i ||x − y||2 + 2βi||∇xigi(x)||||x − y||. And vice
versa,
||∇xigi(x)||2 = ||∇yigi(y) +∇xigi(x)−∇yigi(y)||2 (35)
≤
(
||∇yigi(y)||+ ||∇xigi(x)−∇yigi(y)||
)2
by triangle inequality (36)
= ||∇yigi(y)||2 + ||∇xigi(x)−∇yigi(y)||2 + 2||∇yigi(y)||||∇xigi(x)−∇yigi(y)||
(37)
≤ ||∇yigi(y)||2 + β2i ||x− y||2 + 2βi||∇yigi(y)||||x− y|| by Lipschitz gradient and Lemma 3
(38)
which implies ||∇xigi(x)||2 − ||∇yigi(y)||2 ≤ β2i ||x − y||2 + 2βi||∇yigi(y)||||x − y||. The two
implications together imply∣∣∣||∇xigi(x)||2 − ||∇yigi(y)||2∣∣∣ ≤ β2i ||x− y||2 + 2βi max{||∇xigi(x)||, ||∇yigi(y)||}||x− y||
(39)
≤ β2i ||x− y||2 + 2βi max{||∇xigi(x)||, ||∇xigi(x)||+ βi||x− y||}||x− y||
(40)
= 3β2i ||x− y||2 + 2βi||∇xigi(x)||||x− y|| (41)
where the last inequality follows from Lemma 3.
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Lemma 5. If fAi (xi, x−i) = gi(x) has a βi-Lipschitz gradient, then there exists a ∆t > 0 sufficiently
small s.t.
〈∇xigi(x),∇x′igi(x′)〉 ≥ ||∇xigi(x)||2 − δi∆t− γi∆t2 ≥ 0 (42)
where x′i = xi − ∆t∇xigi(x) for each i, ∆t > 0, δi = βi||∇xigi(x)||ζ, γi = 2β2i ζ2, and
ζ =
√∑
j ||∇xjgj(x)||2.
Proof. We begin with the assumption of a Lipschitz gradient which trivially implies the following:
||∇xigi(x)−∇yigi(y)|| ≤ βi||x− y|| ∀x, y (43)
=⇒ ||∇xigi(x)−∇yigi(y)||2 ≤ β2i ||x− y||2 ∀x, y. (44)
This, in turn, is equivalent to
〈∇xigi(x)−∇yigi(y),∇xigi(x)−∇yigi(y)〉 ≤ β2i ||x− y||2 ∀x, y (45)
= ||∇xigi(x)||2 + ||∇yigi(y)||2 − 2〈∇xigi(x),∇yigi(y)〉 ≤ β2i ||x− y||2 ∀x, y. (46)
Rearranging terms gives
〈∇xigi(x),∇yigi(y)〉 ≥
1
2
[
||∇xigi(x)||2 + ||∇yigi(y)||2 − β2i ||x− y||2
]
∀x, y. (47)
Now let yi = x′i = xi −∆t∇xigi(x) for each i. Lemma 4 implies
||∇x′igi(x′)||2 ≥ ||∇xigi(x)||2 − 3β2i ||x− y||2 − 2βi||∇xigi(x)||||x− y|| (48)
= ||∇xigi(x)||2 − 3β2i ∆t2
∑
j
||∇xjgj(x)||2︸ ︷︷ ︸
ζ2
−2βi∆t||∇xigi(x)||
√∑
j
||∇xjgj(x)||2︸ ︷︷ ︸
ζ
.
(49)
Then
〈∇xigi(x),∇x′igi(x′)〉 ≥
1
2
[
||∇xigi(x)||2 + ||∇x′igi(x′)||2 −∆t2β2i
∑
j
||∇xjgj(x)||2
]
(50)
≥ 1
2
[
2||∇xigi(x)||2 − 2βi∆t||∇xigi(x)||ζ − 3∆t2β2i ζ2 −∆t2β2i ζ2
]
(51)
= ||∇xigi(x)||2 −∆tβi||∇xigi(x)||ζ − 2∆t2β2i ζ2 (52)
= ||∇xigi(x)||2 − δi∆t− γi∆t2 (53)
where δi = βi||∇xigi(x)||ζ and γi = 2β2i ζ2. Note that ||∇xigi(x)||2 ≥ 0 and if ||∇xigi(x)||2 = 0,
then 〈∇xigi(x),∇x′igi(x′)〉 = 0.
Lemma 6. If fAi (xi, x−i) = gi(x) has a βi-Lipschitz gradient, then
fAi (xi, x
′
−i) ≥ fAi (x′i, x′−i) + 〈∇x′ifAi (x′i, x′−i), xi − x′i〉 −
βi
2
||xi − x′i||2 (54)
where x′i = xi −∆t∇xigi(x) for each i and ∆t > 0.
Proof. Let fAi (xi, x
′
−i) = hi(xi). We begin with the assumption of a Lipschitz gradient which
implies the following:
||∇xihi(xi)−∇yihi(yi)|| ≤ βi||xi − yi|| ∀x, y (55)
=⇒ |hi(xi)− hi(yi)− 〈∇yihi(yi), xi − yi〉| ≤
βi
2
||xi − yi||2 ∀x, y. (56)
This then implies
hi(xi) = hi(yi) + 〈∇yihi(yi), xi − yi〉+ κi||xi − yi||2 ∀x, y where κi ∈ [−
βi
2
,
βi
2
] (57)
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Rewriting with fAi for clarity, letting yi = x
′
i = xi −∆t∇xigi(x) for each i, and selecting the lower
bound gives
fAi (xi, x
′
−i) ≥ fAi (x′i, x′−i) + 〈∇x′ifAi (x′i, x′−i), xi − x′i〉 −
βi
2
||xi − x′i||2. (58)
Lemma 7. If every fAi (xi, x−i) = gi(x) has a βi-Lipschitz gradient, then by Lemmas 5 and 6, there
exists a ∆t such that
N∑
i=1
fAi (xi, x
′
−i) ≥
N∑
i=1
fAi (x
′
i, x
′
−i) + ai︸︷︷︸
≥0
(59)
where x′i = xi −∆t∇xifAi (x) and ai = ||∇xifAi (xi, x−i)||2 − δi∆t− γi∆t2 for each i.
Proof. Consider simultaneous gradient descent dynamics. Let x′i = xi −∆t∇xifAi (x). Then by
Lemmas 5 and 6, we find
fAi (xi, x
′
−i) ≥ fAi (x′i, x′−i) + 〈∇x′ifAi (x′i, x′−i), xi − x′i〉 −
βi
2
||xi − x′i||2 (60)
= fAi (x
′
i, x
′
−i) + ∆t〈∇x′ifAi (x′i, x′−i),∇xifAi (xi, x−i)〉 −
βi
2
||xi − x′i||2 (61)
= fAi (x
′
i, x
′
−i) + ∆t〈∇x′ifAi (x′i, x′−i),∇xifAi (xi, x−i)〉 −
βi
2
∆t2||∇xifAi (xi, x−i)||2
(62)
≥ fAi (x′i, x′−i) + ||∇xifAi (xi, x−i)||2∆t− ξi∆t2 − γi∆t3︸ ︷︷ ︸
ai
(63)
where ξi = δi + βi2 ||∇xifAi (xi, x−i)||2. The parameters ξi and γi are bounded, therefore, there
exists a ∆t > 0 small enough such that ai ≥ 0.
Theorem 8 (Local Smoothness). Given n losses, fAi (x), i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, with βi-Lipschitz gradients
there exists a ∆t > 0 sufficiently small such that the game defined by these losses is smooth only if
N∑
i=1
ai ≤ λ
N∑
i=1
fAi (xi, x−i) + (µ− 1)
N∑
i=1
fAi (x
′
i, x
′
−i) ∀xi (64)
where x′i = xi −∆t∇xifAi (x) and ai = ||∇xifAi (xi, x−i)||2∆t− ξi∆t2 − γi∆t3 ≥ 0. Note this
is a necessary, not sufficient condition for a game to be globally smooth.
Proof. Plugging Lemma 7 into the original definition of smoothness for x′i = xi −∆t∇xifAi (x)
and ∆t sufficiently small gives
N∑
i=1
fAi (x
′
i, x
′
−i) + ai ≤
N∑
i=1
fAi (xi, x
′
−i) ≤ λ
N∑
i=1
fAi (xi, x−i) + µ
N∑
i=1
fAi (x
′
i, x
′
−i). (65)
Rearranging the outer terms of the inequalities gives
N∑
i=1
ai ≤ λ
N∑
i=1
fAi (xi, x−i) + (µ− 1)
N∑
i=1
fAi (x
′
i, x
′
−i). (66)
Note this is different than the definition of local smoothness in [44].
Theorem 9. Given n losses, fAi (x), i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, with βi-Lipschitz gradients there exists a ∆t > 0
sufficiently small such that the utilitarian local price of anarchy of the game (to O(∆t2)) is upper
bounded by
ρ ≤ max
i
{1 + ∆t ReLU
( d
dt
log(fAi (x)) +
||∇xifAi (x)||2
fAi (xi, x−i)µ¯
)
} (67)
where i indexes each agent and µ¯ is a user defined positive scalar.
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Proof. To ease exposition, let bi = fAi (xi, x−i) and ci = f
A
i (x
′
i, x
′
−i) so that local smoothness
becomes
N∑
i=1
ai ≤ λ
N∑
i=1
bi + (µ− 1)
N∑
i=1
ci. (68)
If each agent i ensures local individual smoothness is satisfied, i.e.,
ai ≤ λibi + (µi − 1)ci, (69)
then this is sufficient to satisfy local smoothness
N∑
i=1
ai ≤ max
i
{λi}
N∑
i=1
bi + (max
i
{µi} − 1)
N∑
i=1
ci. (70)
Rearranging inequality 69 and letting µˆi = 1− µi, aˆi = ai/bi, and cˆi = ci/bi gives
λi ≥ ai
bi
− (µi − 1)ci
bi
(71)
λi ≥ aˆi + µˆicˆi. (72)
Let each agent i attempt to measure the local price of anarchy given the losses it observes on its
trajectory and call this measure ρi. Then
ρi = inf
λi,µˆi
[λi
µˆi
]
(73)
s.t. (74)
λi ≥ aˆi + cˆiµˆi (75)
λi ≥ µˆi (76)
µˆi > 0 (77)
µˆi ≤ µ¯ (78)
where constraint 75 ensures local individual smoothness, constraint 76 encodes that price of anarchy
≥ 1 by definition, and constraint 77 is required by the original conditions on µ for smoothness. Note
that including an additional constraint for λi > 0 would be redundant and so is omitted. Constraint 78
is optional and included to encode a prior by the agents on the smoothness parameters.
Recall that aˆi and cˆi are both non-negative; cˆi controls the slope of constraint 75. We can solve this
optimization in closed form for the four distinct cases outlined in Figure 6.
Figure 6: From left to right: a) cˆi > 1, b) cˆi = 1, c) cˆi < 1 and cˆi + aˆiµ¯ ≤ 1, d) cˆi < 1 and
cˆi +
aˆi
µ¯ > 1.
Figure 6 shows µˆ always leads to minimal ρi at µ¯, therefore maxi{µi} = maxi{1−µˆi} = 1−µ¯. And
so ρ ≤ maxi{λi}µ¯ = maxi{ρi} = max(1, maxi{aˆi+µ¯cˆi}µ¯ ) = max(1,maxi{ aˆiµ¯ + cˆi}). Assuming µ¯ is
large allows us to approximate with max(1,maxi{cˆi}), so the local price of anarchy is determined
by the largest increase in loss over all the agents; if all losses are decreasing, the local price of anarchy
is 1.
In summary, if cˆi < 1 and µ¯ ≥ aˆi1−cˆi (the intersection points of constraints 75 and 76), then ρi = 1.
The latter inequality, aˆi1−cˆi ≤ µ¯, can be rewritten as cˆi ≤ 1− aˆiµ¯ . Alternatively, if cˆi = 1 and µ¯→∞
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(i.e., constraint 78 is omitted), ρi also equals 1. In all other cases, ρi = aˆiµ¯i + cˆi. If we assume aˆi > 0
(i.e., ||∇xifAi (x)|| > 0), we can reduce the cases above to{
ρi = 1, if cˆi ≤ 1− aˆiµ¯
ρi = cˆi +
aˆi
µ¯ , else.
(79)
Let i = aˆiµ¯ > 0, then the two cases can be rewritten succinctly as
ρi = max(1, cˆi + i). (80)
If we expand cˆi as a series we find
cˆi =
fAi (x
′)
fAi (x)
(81)
=
fAi (x) +
dfAi (x)
dt ∆t
fAi (x)
+O(∆t2) (82)
= 1 +
dfAi (x)
dt
fAi (x)
∆t+O(∆t2). (83)
Therefore, to O(∆t2),
ρi = max(1, 1 +
[ dfAi (x)
dt
fAi (x)
+
i︷ ︸︸ ︷
||∇xifAi (x)||2
fAi (xi, x−i)µ¯
]
∆t) (84)
= 1 + ∆tmax(0,
dfAi (x)
dt
fAi (x)
+
||∇xifAi (x)||2
fAi (xi, x−i)µ¯
) (85)
= 1 + ∆t ReLU
( d
dt
log(fAi (x)) +
||∇xifAi (x)||2
fAi (xi, x−i)µ¯
)
(86)
= 1 + ∆t ReLU
( d
dt
log(fAi (x))
)
as µ¯→∞. (87)
The following lemma establishes that the proposed bound may be tight in some games although we
do not conjecture that this bound is at all tight in general.
Lemma 10. The local ρ bound with µ→∞ in Eqn (67) is tight for some games.
Proof. Consider the two player game with loss functions f1(x1) = x1−κx2 and f2(x2) = x2−κx1
for players 1 and 2 respectively with κ > 1. Assume the player strategies are constrained to the line
segment x1(τ) = x1 − τ∆t and x2(τ) = x2 − τ∆t with τ ∈ [0, 1]. Also, let x1 = x2 and recall
each player is assumed to run gradient descent
Then df1dt =
∂f1
∂x1
dx1
dt +
∂f1
∂x2
dx2
dt = κ− 1 > 0. Similarly, df2dt = κ− 1. Given x1 = x2, the price of
anarchy bound simplifies to 1 + ∆tReLU ddt log(f
A
i (x)) = 1 + ∆tReLU
d/dtfAi (x)
fAi (x)
= 1 + ∆t κ−1fi(x) .
Also, f1(x(τ)) = x1 − τ∆t − κ(x2 − τ∆t) = x1 − κx2 − τ∆t(1 − κ) = f1(x) + τ∆t(κ − 1).
Likewise, f2(x(τ)) = f2(x) + τ∆t(κ − 1). By inspection, the Nash occurs where x1 and x2 are
minimal along the segment at τ = 1, so x∗1 = x1 −∆t and x∗2 = x2 −∆t. The values at Nash are
f1(x
∗) = f1(x) + ∆t(κ− 1) and f2(x(τ)) = f2(x) + ∆t(κ− 1). In contrast, optimal group loss,
minx1,x2(1− κ)(x1(τ) + x2(τ)), occurs at τ = 0 and with values of f1(x) and f2(x). This implies
the true price of anarchy is 1 + ∆t 2(κ−1)f1(x)+f2(x) . Given x1 = x2, the true price of anarchy simplifies to
1 + ∆t κ−1fi(x) which is the same as the upper bound.
The goal of this work is to derive an approximate proxy that can be both easily estimated and
optimized. The bound we derive relies on first order information. It would be interesting to tighten
the bound with second order information or by computing the price of anarchy for an appropriate
polymatrix approximation to the game.
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D.1 Accommodating Negative Loss Functions
In experiments, we replace the second term, i, with a constant hyperparameter :
ρi = 1 + ∆t ReLU
( d
dt
log(fAi (x)) + 
)
. (88)
The log term appears due to price of anarchy being defined as the worst case Nash total loss divided by
the minimal total loss. Although we have not defined an alternative price of anarchy, it is reasonable
to believe one which defines the price of anarchy additively might drop the log term, leading to
minimizing the following:
cˆi = f
A
i (x
′)− fAi (x) (89)
= fAi (x) +
dfAi (x)
dt
∆t− fAi (x) +O(∆t2) (90)
=
dfAi (x)
dt
∆t+O(∆t2) (91)
so that
ρi = ∆t ReLU
( d
dt
fAi (x) + ˜
)
(92)
where ˜i ≈ ||∇xif
A
i (x)||2
µ¯ is replaced in experiments with a constant hyperparameter, ˜ as before. This
objective is appealing as it does not require losses to be positive.
D.1.1 Multiplicative vs Additive Price of Anarchy
In §2.5, we proposed an alternative gradient direction to the one derived in Eqn (5). This was a
pragmatic change to make D3C amenable to games with negative loss, but may have appeared
theoretically unappealing to the reader. Here, we show that the price of anarchy, as a multiplicative
ratio, is already a somewhat arbitrary and non-robust choice.
Specifically, the price of anarchy of a game is not invariant to a global offset to the loss functions. Let
the original price of anarchy of a game be ab . Consider adding a constant c to each of the n losses in
the game; note this does not change the locations of the Nash equilibrium or the total loss minimizer.
However, the new price of anarchy becomes a+ncb+nc → 1 as c→∞. On the other hand, let c→ −b/n
from the right. Then the new price of anarchy approaches infinity. In summary, the price of anarchy,
as defined multiplicatively, can be made arbitrarily large or small by adding a constant to each loss
function in the game.
By removing the log term from the gradient,∇Aiρi, we effectively removed this effect. Lastly, the
most important and general part of gradient direction, ∇Aiρi, is the the Improve-Stay, Suffer-Shift
component which is retained in ∇˜Aiρi.
D.1.2 Why Minimize ddtf
A
i (x) w.r.t. Ai? Why Not
d
dtfi(x)?
The local price of anarchy is defined using the time derivative of the transformed loss. Instead, can
agents minimize the time derivative of their original loss w.r.t. Ai? Note the dependence on Ai
appears in the time derivative terms through the update dynamics, e.g. dxidt =
dxi
dt (A).
In our loss mixing model, agent i can influence the update of agent j directly through Ai. This occurs
because the transformed losses are computed using A> and so Aij is used to re-mix agent j’s loss.
This allows agent i to affect the h(dxj 6=idt ) terms mentioned back in §B.2 and §B.3, circumventing the
issues originally discussed in those sections.
However, we conducted experiments on the prisoner’s dilemma using this approach, and although
minimizing ddtfi(x) w.r.t. Ai worked for the 2-player variant, it failed to minimize the price of
anarchy for 3, 5, or 10 players. Therefore, we discontinued its use in further experiments.
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D.2 Egalitarian Price of Anarchy
If the objective of interest is egalitarian rather than utilitarian, then a game is (λ, µ)-smooth instead
if:
N∑
i=1
fAi (xi, x
′
−i) ≤ λmax
i
fAi (xi, x−i) + µmax
i
fAi (x
′
i, x
′
−i) (93)
for all x, x′ ∈ X where λ > 0, µ < 1, and maxi fAi (x) is assumed to be non-negative for any x ∈ X .
The price of anarchy, ρe, gives the ratio of the worst case Nash max-loss to the minimal max-loss:
ρ =
maxX∗ maxi fAi (x
∗)
minX maxi fAi (x)
≥ 1 (94)
≤ inf
λ>0,µ<1
[ λ
1− µ
]
(95)
where x∗ is an element of the set of Nash equilibria, X ∗.
Theorem 11. Given n losses, fAi (x), i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, with βi-Lipschitz gradients there exists a
∆t > 0 sufficiently small such that the local egalitarian price of anarchy of the game (to O(∆t2)) is
upper bounded by
ρe ≤ 1 + ∆t ReLU
( d
dt
log(max
i
{fAi (x)}) +
N∑
i=1
||∇xifAi (x)||2
fAi (xi, x−i)µ¯
)
. (96)
where i indexes each agent and µ¯ is a user defined positive scalar.
Proof. By Lemma 7,
N∑
i=1
fAi (x
′
i, x
′
−i) + ai ≤
N∑
i=1
fAi (xi, x
′
−i) ≤ λmax
i
fAi (xi, x−i) + µmax
i
fAi (x
′
i, x
′
−i). (97)
Rearranging the outer terms of the inequalities gives
N∑
i=1
ai ≤ λmax
i
fAi (xi, x−i) + µmax
i
fAi (x
′
i, x
′
−i)−
N∑
i=1
fAi (x
′
i, x
′
−i) (98)
≤ λmax
i
fAi (xi, x−i) + (µ− 1) max
i
fAi (x
′
i, x
′
−i) (99)
=⇒ a ≤ λb+ (µ− 1)c. (100)
where a =
∑N
i=1 ai, b = maxi f
A
i (xi, x−i), and c = maxi f
A
i (x
′
i, x
′
−i). The proof proceeds as
before in the utilitarian case except the price of anarchy does not decompose into a max over
agent-centric estimates.
E Description of Games in Experiments
We describe the traffic network and prisoner’s dilemma games in detail here. We point the reader
to [10] for further details of Coins and [22] for Cleanup.
E.1 Generating Networks that Exhibit Braess’s Paradox
In order to randomly generate a traffic network exhibiting Braess’s paradox, it is sufficient to guarantee
two properties. One is that the shortcut route is a strictly dominant path (shorter commute time). This
ensures all agents take the shortcut in the Nash equilibrium. The other is that there exists a joint
strategy avoiding the shortcut with lower total commute time than all agents taking the shortcut. We
assume there are four drivers.
The shortcut, SABE, is a strictly dominant (strictly shorter commute) if
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Figure 7: A theoretical traffic nework with congestion parameters, F and G, and constant commute
time parameters C, D, and E.
Fnsa +Gnbe + E < Fnsa + C (101)
Fnsa +Gnbe + E < Gnbe +D (102)
=⇒ E < min{C −Gnbe, D − Fnsa} (103)
=⇒ G < C
nbe
which is ensured if C > 4G (104)
=⇒ F < C
nsa
which is ensured if D > 4F. (105)
And there exists a pure joint strategy with at least ∆ less total commute time if
τNash = 4(4(F +G) + E) (106)
τOpt = arg min
nsa∈{1,2,3},nbe=4−nsa
{nsa(Fnsa + C) + nbe(Gnbe +D)} (107)
τNash > τOpt + ∆ =⇒ E > τopt + ∆
4
− 4(F +G). (108)
So we can randomly generate a Braess network with Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4 gen_braess
fail← True
while fail do
F ∼ {1, . . . , 20}
G ∼ {1, . . . , 20}
C ∼ {4G+ 10, . . . , 4G+ 20} . 10 is an arbitrary buffer
D ∼ {4F + 10, . . . , 4F + 20} . 20 is an arbitrary upper limit
τOpt ← arg minnsa∈{1,2,3},nbe=4−nsa{nsa(Fnsa + C) + nbe(Gnbe +D)}
Emin = max{ τOpt+∆4 − 4(F +G), 0}
Emax = min{C − 4G,D − 4F}
if Emin < Emax then
fail← False
E ∼ {Emin, . . . , Emax}
end if
end while
Output: C, D, E, F , G
The expected commute times for this Braess network can be computed exactly given stochastic
commuting policies. Consider a network with four drivers and let xij specify the probability of driver
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i taking route j through the network. Then let
x =

x11
x12
x13
...
x41
x42
x43

, b =
[
C
D
E
]
, M =
[
F 0 F
0 G G
F G F +G
]
, br =
bbb
b
 , Mr =
MMM
M
 , I = [1 0 00 1 0
0 0 1
]
(109)
and let
S = [I I I I] , Ai =
1(i == 1)I 0 0 00 1(i == 2)I 0 00 0 1(i == 3)I 0
0 0 0 1(i == 4)I
 . (110)
Then τr = MrSx+ br gives commute time for each path replicated for four agents:
τr = MrSx+ br (111)
=

top route time for player 1
bottom route time for player 1
shortcut time for player 1
...
top route time for player 4
bottom route time for player 4
shortcut time for player 4

. (112)
The expected commute time for agent 1 is just the inner product of the first 3 entries of this vector
with agent 1’s policy. We use the matrix Ai to effectively select the appropriate commute times from
τr. Continuing, let
Qi = A
>
i MrS (113)
di = A
>
i br = Aibr (114)
Ci = Cov(xi) = diag(xi)− xix>i (115)
C = Cov(x) = block_diag(Ci). (116)
We can now write agent i’s loss as
li(x) = (Aix)
>τr (117)
= x>Qix+ d>i x (118)
E[li(x)] = E[x>Qix] + d>i x (119)
= Tr(QiC) + x
>Qix+ d>i x (120)
= Tr(MCi) + x
>Qix+ d>i x (121)
which is easily amenable to analysis and makes the fact that the loss is quadratic, readily apparent.
E.2 A Reformulation of the Prisoner’s Dilemma
In an n-player prisoner’s dilemma, each player must decide to defect or cooperate with each of the
other players creating a combinatorial action space of size 2n−1. This requires a payoff tensor with
2n(n−1) entries. Instead of generalizing prisoner’s dilemma [40] to n players using nth order tensors,
we translate it to a game with convex loss functions. Figure 8 shows how we can accomplish this.
Generalizing this to n players, we say that for all i, j, k distinct, 1) player i wants to defect against
player j, 2) player i wants player j to defect against player k, and 3) player i wants player j to
cooperate with itself. In other words, each player desires a free-for-all with the exception that no one
attacks it. See §E.2 for more details.
22
Figure 8: A reformulation of the prisoner’s dilemma using convex loss functions instead of a normal
form payoff table.
We can define the vector of loss functions succinctly with
f(x) =
(x>x>
x>
− C)2 (elementwise) (122)
where x = [xij ] is a column vector (i ∈ [1, n], j ∈ [1, n− 1], values flattened in major-row order)
containing the player strategies and C is an n× n(n− 1) matrix with entries that either equal 0 or
c ∈ R+.
More specifically, C is a circulant matrix with column order reversed. For example, the matrix C
associated with the three player game is
C =
[
0 0 c 0 0 c
0 c 0 0 c 0
c 0 0 c 0 0
]
(123)
where c > 0. Setting xij = 0 encodes that player i has defected against its jth opponent. In the first
row of C above, the first two entries can be read as player 1 is incentivized to defect against players 2
and 3. The next two entries state that player 1 receives a penalty if player 2 doesn’t cooperate, but
wants player 2 to defect against player 3. The final two entries state that player 1 receives a penalty
if player 3 doesn’t cooperate, but wants player 3 to defect against player 2. The matrix, C, can be
constructed for n-player games with numpy [37] as
row = numpy.array(([0]*(n-1)+[c])*(n-1))[::-1]
C = scipy.linalg.circulant(row1)[:n,::-1]
Note that this matrix is of size n× n(n− 1) or O(n3) entries.
The minimal total loss for this problem is (n− 1)2c2 and occurs at xij = cn :
ftotal = 1
> ~f(x) =
n∑
i=1
n−1∑
j=1
(n− 1)x2ij + (xij − c)2 (124)
∂ftotal
∂xij
= 2(n− 1)xij + 2(xij − c) = 0 (125)
=⇒ xij = c
n
(126)
=⇒ ftotal = n(n− 1)
[ (n− 1)c2
n2
+
(n− 1)2c2
n2
]
= (n− 1)2c2. (127)
Nash occurs at the origin. This can be quickly derived by leveraging variational inequality theory [14,
33] and noticing that the Jacobian of gradient descent dynamics is 2I , hence strongly monotone.
Strongly monotone variational inequalities have unique a Nash equilibrium coinciding with the
strategy set at which the gradients are all zero (assuming this point lies in X ). The total loss at Nash
(xij = 0) is n(n− 1)c by inspection.
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E.2.1 Prisoner’s Dilemma Variant Experiments
Figure 9 shows that D3C with a randomly initialized strategy successfully minimizes the price
of anarchy. In contrast, gradient descent learners provably converge to Nash at the origin with
ρ = nc(n−1) . The price of anarchy grows unbounded as c → 0. We set n = 10 and c = 1 in
experiments for a mild ρ = 109 .
Figure 9: Prisoner’s Dilemma Convergence to ρ = 1 (left) and the unique optimal joint strategy
(right) over 1000 runs. The shaded region captures ± 1 standard deviation around the mean (too
small to see on left). Gradient descent (not shown) provably converges to Nash.
Figure 10 highlights a single training run. Both agents are initialized to minimize their original loss,
but then learn over training to minimize the mean of the two player losses.
Figure 10: Prisoner’s Dilemma Single run: relative loss attention measured as ln
(
Aii
Aj 6=i
)
(left) and
player losses, fi, (right).
E.2.2 Cooperation Robust to Mavericks
Proposition 12. In heterogeneous populations containing both D3C agents and selfish (gradient
descent) agents, D3C agents end up with strictly lower loss when playing the proposed reformulation
of the prisoner’s dilemma.
Proof. Note that player i controls variables xij and suffers loss fi(x). Assume some subset of the
players defect and play some fixed strategy. Let this subset be the players 1 through m w.l.o.g.
because the player losses are symmetric. The remaining player (non-defector) losses can be rewritten
as
fi>m(x) = f(x|C{i>m,j>m(n−1)}) +K (128)
where K is some vector-valued constant independent of these non-defectors’ strategies. Due to the
structure of C, the losses that remain simply represent a (n −m)-player prisoner’s dilemma. To
see this, consider player 1 defecting in a 3-player prisoner’s dilemma, i.e., consider the C{i>1,j>2}
submatrix. The loss functions for players 2 and 3 depend in exactly the same way on the variables x21
and x32, i.e., (x21−0)2 + (x32−0)2 + · · · , therefore, they will both agree on setting x21 = x32 = 0.
The game that remains is exactly the 2-player prisoner’s dilemma between players 2 and 3. So
assuming these players run our proposed algorithm (D3C), they will converge to minimizing total
loss of this subgame.
Of particular interest is the case where the defectors naively play fixed selfish strategies, i.e., xij = 0.
In this case, cooperating agents not only achieve lower subgroup loss, but also lower individual loss.
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Recall that the loss for each player when all defect (naive selfish play implies xij = 0) is n− 1. If
only a subset of players defect and the remaining cooperate, the defectors achieve losses greater than
n − 1—this can be seen from the fact that xij = 0 is a strict Nash. Therefore, if we show that a
cooperator’s loss is less than n− 1, we prove that cooperators outperform defectors.
Each defector adds 1 to the loss of a cooperator and the loss due to the cooperators’ subgame
prisoner’s dilemma is (n−m−1)
2
n−m (Eqn (127)). Therefore, the loss of a cooperator is m+
(n−m−1)2
n−m .
The loss of a defector is always greater:
(n− 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
defector
−m− (n−m− 1)
2
n−m︸ ︷︷ ︸
cooperator
= (n−m− 1)− (n−m− 1)
2
n−m (129)
=
(n−m)(n−m− 1)− (n−m− 1)2
n−m =
n−m− 1
n−m > 0.
(130)
F Additional Experiments
We present additional results on three RL experiments, one small game as another counterargument
to welfare-maximization, and a negative result for local ρ-minimization (which D3C is an instance
of).
F.1 Trust-Your-Brother
In this game, a predator chases two prey around a table. The predator is a bot with a hard-coded
policy to move towards the nearest prey unless it is already adjacent to a prey, in which case it stays
put. If the prey are equidistant to the predator, the predator flips a coin and moves according to the
coin flip. The prey receive 0 reward if they chose not to move and −.01 if they attempted to move.
They additionally receive −1 if the predator is adjacent to them after moving.
Figure 11: Trust-Your-Brother A bot chases agents around a table. The predator’s prey can only
escape if the other prey simultaneously moves out of the way. Selfish (left), cooperative (right).
The prey employ linear softmax policies (no bias term) and train via REINFORCE [52]. Both prey
receive the same 2-d observation vector. The first feature specifies the counter-clockwise distance to
the predator minus the clockwise distance for the blue prey. The second feature specifies the same for
the green prey. Episodes last 5 steps and there are 6 grid cells in the ring around the table as shown in
Figure 11.
Figure 12 shows D3C approaches maximal total return over training; this is achieved by the agents
compromising on their original reward incentives and paying more attention to those of the other
agent during training.
F.2 LIO Comparison
Yang et al. [55] propose an algorithm LIO (Learning to Incentivize Others) that equips agents
with “gifting” policies represented as neural networks. At each time step, each agent observes the
environment and actions of all other agents to determine how much reward to gift to the other agents.
The parameters of these networks are adjusted to maximize the original environment reward (without
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Figure 12: Trust-Your-Brother Median return achieved during training for agents trained with
policy gradient vs policy gradient augmented with D3C (left); relative reward attention measured
as ln
(
Aii
Aj 6=i
)
where a positive value corresponds to selfish attention and a negative value to other-
regarding (right). The shaded region captures ± 1 standard deviation around the mean from 1000
runs.
Figure 13: Agents are initialized to attend to their own losses. The trajectory here shows the agents
compromising and adjusting to a mixture of losses (start at green, end at red star).
gifts) minus some penalty regularizer for gifting meant to approximately maintain budget-balance. In
order to perform this maximization, each agent requires access to every other agents action-policy,
gifting-policy, and return making this approach difficult to scale and decentralize.
Yang et al. [55] demonstrate LIO’s ability to maximize welfare and achieve division of labor on
a restricted version of the Cleanup game with high apple re-spawn rates and where agents are
constrained to facing in one direction (compare Figure 3 of [55] with Figure 1A of [22]). While Yang
et al. [55] show AC failing to achieve maximal welfare, we found the opposite result using A2C [13]
in Figure 14. In Figure 14, we also see that D3C is able to achieve near optimality. LIO appears to be
approach maximal welfare as well in Figure 6C, therefore, this environment setting does not appear
to differentiate the two approaches.
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Average Total Return
Figure 14: Mini-Cleanup Comparison against the mini Cleanup environment described in [55]. In
LIO, each agent requires access to every other agent’s policy which makes implementing it within
our decentralized codebase intractable. We suggest comparing the asymptotes of this plot with that of
Figure 6C in [55].
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F.3 HarvestPatch
McKee et al. [30] introduce HarvestPatch as a common-pool resource game where apples spawn in
predefined patches throughout a map. Agents must abstain from over-farming patches to the point of
extinction by distributing their apple consumption as a group evenly across patches.
Figure 15 compares D3C against direct welfare maximization (Cooperation) and individual agent RL
(A2C) on HarvestPatch.
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Figure 15: HarvestPatch Comparison against the HarvestPatch environment described in [30]. D3C
is able to increase welfare over the baseline approach of A2C at a slow rate.
F.4 Implicit Inequity Aversion
Welfare optimization can lead to poor outcomes as well, creating great inequity [4, 5, 16]. We show
that our approach generalizes beyond the goal of minimizing group loss to other interesting settings.
Game 2 (Efficient but Unfair): minx1∈R x21, minx2∈R x22 − 1110x21.
The minimal total loss solution of Game 2 is (x1, x2) = (±∞, 0) where x1 achieves infi-
nite loss and y achieves negative infinite loss. On the other hand, the Nash equilibrium is
(x1, x2) = (0, 0) with a loss of zero for both agents. This hypothetical game may also arise if a loss
is mis-specified. For example, x1’s true loss may have been 2x21 implying no inequity issue with total
loss minimization in the original game. The inequity of the cooperative solution to Game 2 may
be undesirable. D3C converges to losses of 1.079 and −1.162 for x1 and x2 respectively (sum is
−0.083) with x1 shifting its relative loss attention to A11A12 ≈ 1110 effectively halting training.
F.5 Limits of a Local Update
We use a 2-player bilinear matrix game to highlight the limitations of a local ρ-minimization approach.
Consider initializing Aij = 12 so that the agents are purely cooperative. Even in this scenario, there
are games where the agents minimizing local ρ will get stuck in local, suboptimal minima of the total
loss landscape. Consider the following game transformed into an optimization problem via Aij = 12 :
min
x1
x>1 B1x2 min
x2
x>1 B2x2 =⇒ min
x1
min
x2
x>1 (B1 +B2)x2 = x
>
1 Cx2 = fC(x1,x2) (131)
with x1,x2 ∈ ∆1. Let C = [a, b; c, d]. Then the Hessian of the cooperative objective fC(x1,x2)
has eigenvalues ±|a− b− c+ d|. This function is generally a saddle with possibly two local minima.
For example, set a = d = 0, b = − 34 , and c = −1. With random initializations, gradient descent will
converge to (p, q) = (1, 0) 37 of the time with a value of b, else (p, q) = (1, 0) with a value of c, so
we cannot expect local ρ-minimization to solve 2-player bilinear matrix games, in general, either.
G Agents
G.1 Hyperparameters
Trust-Your-Brother: The reinforcement learning algorithm, L, used for D3C in Trust-Your-Brother
is REINFORCE [52]. Policy gradients are computed using batches of 10 episodes (full Monte Carlo
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Game ηA δ ν τmin τmax A0i  l h
Trust-Your-Brother 1.0 1.0 0.0 10 20 0.99 0.0 −5 5
Coins/Cleanup/HarvestPatch 10−3 10−1 10−6 5 10 0.99 100.0 −5 5
Table 1: D3C hyperparameter settings for Algorithm 1.
returns, discount γ = 1). Each batch of 10 episodes contains 5 episodes initialized with one prey
closer to the predator, having only one grid space between itself and the predator. The other 5
episodes swap the prey so that each is attacked an equivalent number of times. Both prey always start
in adjacent cells. The baseline subtracted from the returns is computed from linear value function.
This value function is trained via temporal difference learning with a learning rate 0.1. The learning
rate for REINFORCE is 0.1.
Coins/Cleanup/HarvestPatch: The reinforcement learning algorithm, L, used for D3C in Coins,
Cleanup, and HarvestPatch (§F.3) is A2C with V-trace [13].
Hyperparameter Value
Entropy regularization 0.003
Baseline loss scaling 0.5
Unroll length 100
Discount (γ) 0.98
RMSProp learning rate 0.0004
RMSProp epsilon () regularization parameter 10−5
RMSProp momentum 0.0
RMSProp decay 0.99
Table 2: A2C hyperparameter settings for Coin, Cleanup, and HarvestPatch domains. No tuning or
hyperparameter search was performed —these were default values used by our RL stack.
H Miscellaneous
H.1 Stealing vs Altruism
In our proposed mixing scheme, each agent i updates Ai ∈ ∆n−1 and transformed losses are defined
as fA = A>f . This can be interpreted as each agent i deciding how to redistribute its losses over the
other agents. In other words, agent i is deciding who to steal from (give loss equals steal reward).
Alternatively, we could define a scheme where each agent i updates Ai, however, the transformed
losses are now defined as fA = Af and the columns of A lie on the simplex. This scenario
corresponds to agents taking on the losses of other agents. In other words, deciding which agents
to help. In experiments on the prisoner’s dilemma, this approach did not make significant progress
towards minimizing the price of anarchy so we discontinued its use in further experiments. In theory,
this approach should be viable; it just requires that the information contained in agent j’s loss is
enough to accelerate descent of agent i’s loss faster than the immediate loss (debt) that agent i takes
on.
H.1.1 Towards A Market of Agents
Expanding on this last perspective, when D3C agents, as defined in the main body, steal from other
agents, they are exchanging immediate reward for information. The agent that is “stolen from"
receives a loss signal that can then be used to derive policy update directions. The agent that is
“stealing" receives immediate relief of loss, a form of payment. This exchange forms some of
the components critical for a market economy of agents. The essential missing component is the
negotiation phase where agents can choose to opt in or out of the exchange. In the current setting, the
agent who steals is always able to force a transaction.
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H.2 Reciprocity in Coin Domain
To evaluate the extent to which there was a pattern of reciprocity in agents’ relative reward attention
(i.e., the attention shifted synchronously), we conduct a permutation analysis. This permutation
analysis estimates the probability that the level of synchrony we observe results from random chance.
We measure the synchrony between relative reward attention trajectories through co-integration [31].
Co-integration allows us to estimate the synchrony between two timeseries. To do so, we take the
discrete differences within each timeseries and then take the correlation of those two sequences of
differences. If the timeseries are correlated, their movements should be correlated. This produces a
set of co-integration coefficients ranging from 0.19 to 0.34 (see Figure 16, red).
To ensure that we are not overestimating the significance of these patterns, we employ a permutation
analysis [50]. We resample the trajectories to calculate all possible values of co-integration coefficients
(see Figure 16, blue). Comparing the real set against the full resampled set allows us to evaluate
how extreme the real values are, under the assumption that there is no relationship between the two
curves. The actual co-integration coefficients are the most extreme values across the full distribution
of coefficients. To estimate the overall probability of this occurring, we evaluate the harmonic mean
p-value [53]. We find that the level of synchrony observed between the relative reward attention of
co-learning agents significantly deviates from chance levels with p = 0.018.
Figure 16: Histogram of co-integration coefficients for actual and resampled relative reward attention
trajectories.
H.3 Convex Optimization vs Smooth 1-Player Games
Proposition 13. A convex loss function is not necessarily a smooth game where the players are
interpreted as the elements of the variable to be minimized.
Proof. Consider the following game:
min
x
(x+ y)2 min
y
(x+ y)2. (132)
Recall the definition of a smooth game (Definition 2) and let x = y = 0 and x′ = −y′ = c. The
game is not smooth for c > 0 for any λ, µ even though this is a convex optimization problem.
H.4 Games with Mixing-Agnostic Universally-Stable Nash
Define the gradient map, FA, and its Jacobian, JA, for a game with loss vector f concisely with
FA(x) = [〈Ai,∇xf(x)〉] (133)
=
[∑
j Aij
∂fj
∂xi
]
(134)
JA(x) =
[∑
j Aij
∂2fj
∂xi∂xk
]
(135)
=
[∑
j AijH
j
ik
]
(136)
where Hj is the Hessian of fj(x).
Proposition 14. If each Hj is diagonally dominant, then JA is diagonally dominant.
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Proof. We are given Hjii >
∑
k 6=i |Hjik|. Then
JAii =
∑
j
AijH
j
ii >
∑
j
Aij
∑
k 6=i
|Hjik| by given & Aij ≥ 0 (137)
=
∑
j
∑
k 6=i
|AijHjik| by Aij ≥ 0 (138)
=
∑
k 6=i
∑
j
|AijHjik| swap sums (139)
≥
∑
k 6=i
|
∑
j
AijH
j
ik| by ∆-inequality (140)
=
∑
k 6=i
|JAik|. (141)
Proposition 15. If each Hj is diagonally dominant and X is unconstrained (i.e., Rd for some d),
then x∗A is the Nash equilibrium of the transformed game (i.e., with loss vector f transformed by A) .
Proof. Proposition 14 implies the dynamical system x˙ = −FA(x) is globally stable at x∗A for every
fixed A. Proposition 14 also implies that each loss in the transformed game is convex. This is because
JAii is the Hessian of each loss i in the new game, and we showed these are positive. Moreover, the
unique fixed point of an unconstrained game with convex losses is the solution to a suitably defined
variational inequality: VI(FA,Rd). This, in turn, implies that the fixed point is the Nash equilibrium
of the game [7].
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